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Abstract. Botnets represent a global problem and are responsible for causing
large financial and operational damage to their victims. They are implemented
with evasion in mind, and aim at hiding their architecture and authors, making
them difficult to detect in general. These kinds of networks are mainly used for
identity theft, virtual extortion, spam campaigns and malware dissemination. Bot-
nets have a great potential in warfare and terrorist activities, making it of utmost
importance to take action against.
We present CONDENSER, a method for identifying data generated by botnet
activity. We start by selecting appropriate the features from several data feeds,
namely DNS non-existent domain responses and live communication packages
directed to command and control servers that we previously sinkholed. By using
machine learning algorithms and a graph based representation of data, then allows
one to identify botnet activity, helps identifying anomalous traffic, quickly detect
new botnets and improve activities of tracking known botnets.
Our main contributions are threefold: first, the use of a machine learning classi-
fier for classifying domain names as being generated by domain generation algo-
rithms (DGA); second, a clustering algorithm using the set of selected features
that groups network communication with similar patterns; third, a graph based
knowledge representation framework where we store processed data, allowing us
to perform queries.
1 Introduction
Currently there is an large number of infections caused by malware present in all sorts
of electronic devices. It is estimated that about 16% to 25% [4] of Internet traffic in
the world comes from communication between various types of malware. Moreover,
because of the pervasive nature of devices such as smartphones and tablets which are
increasingly replacing mobile phones and computers [1], the number of infections is in-
creasing and becoming more complex. More computational power, more tools as well
as more opportunities and targets are available to malware develop, as they start explor-
ing broader features within each device.
⋆ The work of J. Moura is supported by grant SFRH/BD/69006/2010 from Fundação para a
Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT) from the Portuguese Ministério do Ensino e da Ciência.
Botnets are generally deployed for illegal purposes and are used for identity theft,
massive spamming, distributed denial of service (DDoS), government and industrial es-
pionage and unauthorized use of computational resources e.g. for bitcoin mining. Statis-
tics estimate that roughly 75% [14] of all global email traffic is coming from spam, and
that most of this traffic originates from botnets. Recent develops show us that such net-
works also have large potential in scenarios of warfare and terrorism, which is another
reason to put an effort into stoping the authors that produce malware, and consequently
to botnets. There are various governmental authorities, companies and organizations
that struggle daily against these cybercriminals.
Identifying botnets can be done by malware analysis in controlled environments
(e.g. sandboxing or virtualization), or through analysis of malware communication with
the Command and Control (C&C) servers and other infected devices. The two main
ways to detect botnets can be broadly divided into: Passive and Active. Passive detection
is based on communication analysis of packets between the C&C and infected devices,
and has the advantage of providing no warning of the impending discovery of botnet
infrastructure. Active sensing involves, in addition, a direct interaction with the botnet
through the injection of network packets (e.g. dns query to the domain nameserver).
Botnets often implement evasion techniques, making it difficult to take action against.
Some examples are, encrypted communication [15], domain generation algorithms [11]
(DGA), fast-flux and double fast-flux [7]3.
1.1 Objectives
Monitoring network traffic generates large volumes of data that must be processed in or-
der to obtain useful information. In addition, botnet evasion techniques and the diversity
of services that generate network traffic, which is usually encrypted, make it necessary
to examine patterns on sets of features in order to detect botnet activity. The problem is,
thus, one of inferring useful information from a large flux of complex data. In this paper
we present a solution to this problem, using a combination of expert knowledge prepro-
cessing followed by classification and clustering with machine learning algorithms.
This document is divided into four sections. In Section 1, we introduced the mo-
tivation, the context and gave an introduction to the topic of botnets. In Section 2 we
discuss related work and overview existing research within the topic as well as current
solutions to the problem described and present and overview of relevant machine learn-
ing techniques. In Section 3 we present and evaluate the machine learning techniques
we employed and present also a novel method for representing botnet communications
as well as to characterise these botnets in terms of singly connected components of do-
mains and IPs. We finish with conclusions and a discussion of future work in Section 4.
3 Fast-flux is a DNS technique used by botnets in order to hide not only phishing activities but
also sites delivering malware behind networks of compromised hosts that change very often
and that act as proxies.
2 Related Work
There is growing interest in botnet research, both in the industry and in academia, mo-
tivated by the need to counter the criminal activity associated with botnets. In addition
to general security considerations, a major issue in botnet research is the development
of automated detection methods.
This research focused both on active and passive detection. For active detection we
used DNS records analysis. For passive detection we identified three sub-categories:
domain names analysis, flow analysis and packet analysis. For the purpose of this work
we did not consider flow analysis since we were positioned in the middle of devices
communication and NAT and IP pooling makes it harder to detect relevant IP changes.
The literature reports a diversity of approaches to traffic analysis, and thus, illicit ac-
tivity detection. For example, Amini, et al. [2], used Neural Networks to detect network
intrusions; Ruehrup, et al. [10] used common destinations as a way to compute connec-
tion sub-graphs to identify malicious P2P networks; Stalmans, et al. [13] showed that
geographic information of DNS records helped identify suspicious traffic using Morgan
Indexes and the Geary Coefficient. Antonakakis, et al. [3] studied the behavior of some
malware that use Domain Generation Algorithms to reach their C&Cs, and Davuth, et
al. [6] showed that support vector machines could identify generated domain names
with better performance than other classifiers, such as Naïve Bayes and C5.0 classifi-
cation trees. Schiavoni, et al. [11] concluded that domain name analysis alone is not
sufficient to detect botnets, so they included IP and DNS analysis as a similarity feature
to group same DGA domains. This diversity of methods, some using expert knowledge
and others machine learning, inspired our combined approach.
We present next an overview of the machine learning techniques we use in our work.
2.1 Classification: Support Vector Machines
Machine learning is a "field of study that gives computers the ability to learn without
being explicitly programmed", as defined by Arthur Samuel in 1959. In the field of
cyber security and threat intelligence we highlight applications in the areas of malware
detection, malicious traffic detection and spam detection.
In machine learning classification, support vector machines (SVM) are models cre-
ated with supervised learning, associated with learning algorithms that analyze data and
recognize patterns. They are mostly used for classification and regression analysis. In
the case of binary SVMs, given a set of training examples each marked as belonging to
one of two categories, an SVM training algorithm builds a model that assigns new ex-
amples into one category or the other, making it a non-probabilistic linear classifier. An
SVM model is a representation of the examples as points in space, mapped so that the
examples of the categories are divided as best as possible. Examples for classification
are then mapped into that same space and predicted to belong to a category based on
which side of the division they fall on.
In general, an SVM constructs a hyperplane or set of hyperplanes in a high or infi-
nite dimensionality space. Intuitively, a good separation is achieved by the hyperplane
that has the largest distance to the nearest training data point of any class (so-called
functional margin). It is thus the case that, the larger the margin the lower the general-
ization error of the classifier.
2.2 Clustering: Self-Organizing Maps
A self-organizing map (SOM) is a type of artificial neural network that is trained using
unsupervised learning, with the purpose of reducing the dimensionality of features into
a low-dimensional representation of the input space. These self-organizing maps differ
from traditional artificial neural networks in the sense that they use a neighborhood
function to preserve the topological properties of the input space.
2.3 Cluster Interpretation and Validation: Indexes
The Davies-Bouldin [5] index – represented as DBk – identifies clusters that are com-
pact and distant from each other, in Equation 1 the diameter for cluster ci is obtained,
where ni represents the number of points belonging to cluster ci. Symbol zi corre-
sponds to the centroid of cluster ci and x is a point belonging to cluster ci.
DBk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
Maxj=1,...,k,i6=j
{
diam(ci) + diam(cj)
eucl(ci − cj)
}
(1)
In DBk, k corresponds to total number of existing clusters, ci and cj correspond to
to the centroid of clusters i and j respectively.
diss(ci, cj) = minx∈ci,y∈cj ||x− y|| (2)
Equation 2 corresponds to the dissimilarity index between clusters ci and cj , Equa-
tion 3 is the diameter of the cluster C.
diam(C) = maxx,y∈C ||x− y|| (3)
The Silhouette [8] index – represented as SIk – identifies the average membership
of each point to all k clusters, where n is the total number of existing samples in the
dataset, ai is the average distance between point i and all points of its cluster; bi is
the minimum average dissamilarity between point i and all the formed clusters. In this
metric, the partition with bigger SI value is considered optimal.
SIk =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(bi − ai)
max(ai, bi)
(4)
3 Contributions
Currently implemented modules include one Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier
for detecting suspicious domain names (generated by DGA); a Self-Organizing Map for
data clustering; one from two IP reputation services; one from Maltracker4, a malware
4 https://maltracker.net/
analysis platform that extracts information and network behavior of malware samples
ran in sandboxed environments; one from an AnubisNetworks proprietary API inform-
ing whether an IP address had contacted one of AnubisNetworks’ sinkholes; and finally
we developed a module that crawls over DNS servers gathering historic information
about domain names and IPs, with the goal of detecting common name servers and IP
addresses used as C&Cs, botnet domain rotation and botnets that operate using fast-flux
and double fast-flux schemes.
For the DGA classifier and as benign dataset, we used the Top 10,000 domains
from Alexa, and as anomalous dataset we used a dataset of approximately 10,000 DGA
domains provided by AnubisNetworks. We also automated the generation of such clas-
sifier modules by implementing a system for feature selection, training and evaluation
of classifiers, making it simple not only to adapt the current DGA classifier to changes
in the data stream, but also to include other classifiers in the future. The Self-Organizing
Map groups data with similar patterns discarding the source and destination of the data
communication since we want to find similar traffic that can have no intersection in its
communications at all (e.g. same botnet family, different campaign and operators).
3.1 Graph Based Detection
To improve botnet detection, we created a modular application that extracts and aggre-
gates packet data, by combining expert knowledge and machine learning classification
and clustering. This system is composed by a set of modules that obtain information
from external services and incoming packet data. The modular implementation makes
it easier to adapt the system to different data streams, and the combination of expert
knowledge rules and machine learning takes advantage, of both, known indicators of
malicious activity and the capacity of machine learning algorithms to identify patterns
in complex data. The output is a connected graph of the observed communications,
including the data obtained from the modules, where nodes are IPs, domains, SOM
Clusters representing communication with similar patterns and objects such as links
to executable files and/or their signatures that were seen communicating with com-
mon destinations/IPs. With this system, we correlate information gathered from many
sources, to detect suspicious sub-graph topologies and relations that allows us to char-
acterise botnets in terms of singly connected components of domains and IPs.
3.2 Discussion
The presented work aims to identify all types of known botnet topologies (star, dis-
tributed, hybrid), by correlating information from various sources. We based our work
in the existing related work, and we are able to identify common evasion techniques
such as, domain names generated by domain generation algorithms (DGA), with the
corresponding machine learning classifier. The precision of this classifier indicate a
result of 77,9% when ran against a set of domains generated by malware without a
pre-defined dictionary in its implementation (e.g. english names).
With our DNS crawler we gather information about normal and suspect domains,
normally associated with low TTLs and high record changing (associated with fast-
flux and double fast-flux). However there are some legitimate uses that can be miss-
interpreted as these evasion methods. For example, Content Delivery Networks (CDNs)
rely on low TTL records in their domains. This behavior can raise false positives if we
only take the TTL value in consideration. For this reason we must take other informa-
tion when we decide that we are over a new botnet family. Since our work relies in
network communication, and taking in consideration malware that use the network as a
way to communicate with the C&C5, we can gather information about all the malware
lifecycle.
The clustering algorithm provides a way to detect communication with similar pat-
terns of known clusters even if the packet source and destination do not intersect, this
characteristic provide a way to detect same malware families. When we consider the
full system we have a way to detect not only the typical communication cluster, with
enriched data, but also communication that matches already known communication pat-
terns. With the information obtained from our sinkholes we are able to group commu-
nication that matches known botnet families.
Traffic that resulted in non-existent domain (NX-Domain) replies can not be com-
pared with destinations that were "alive" when we take DNS and Geographic IP in-
formation in consideration, for this reason we didn’t include features that match these
information in our machine learning algorithms.
3.3 Evaluation
For the domain name classifier, we obtained 77, 9% of precision, using a set of 11
features. For the clustering algorithm we obtained a rating of 9.32 with the Davies-
Bouldin Index and of aproximately 0.27 for the Silhouette Index with a total of 81
features.
During our research we were not able to compare our results with work available in
the literature because existing work only takes in consideration traffic inside universi-
ties campus, or inside small networks sometimes even with artificially generated traffic
which is also referred in [12], and since we are positioned between internet operators,
we are unable to extract some of the features proposed in related work.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
We developed a system that aims to correlate information from various sources, includ-
ing an automatic classifier taking domain names as inputs and deciding whether they
are part of a DGA or not, information about live samples and sinkholed domains, and
a clustering tool using Self-Organizing Maps to group network traffic having the same
patterns. For checking if a domain name was generated by a DGA, our classifier has
77, 9% of precision, for the clustering algorithm used we obtained a rating of approxi-
mately 9.32 using the Davies-Bouldin Index. As an auxiliary mechanism we developed
a system that crawls over DNS servers, gathering historic DNS information which al-
lows us to discover both fast-flux and double fast-flux domains as well as rotation of
5 Contrary to this, computer worms sometimes do not rely in any type of communication from a
C&C, or can became dormant for a long period of time relying in a physical way of spreading,
like an usb stick. For these cases, we are not able to get data.
C&C servers. We store all this data in a graph that allows us to single out botnets as
singly connected components of malicious servers (domains) and infected machines
(IPs).
As future work, we will proceed with our research by using continuous training
algorithms for the clustering algorithms, such as implementing a growing and hierar-
chical extension of self-organizing maps, termed Growing Hierarchical Self-Organizing
Maps [9] (GHSOM).
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A Considered Features
Table 1. Domain Name Features
Feature Type Feature Description
consonantRatio Numeric Consonant Ratio
consonantVowelRatio Numeric Consonant Vowel Ratio
domainLength Numeric Domain Length normalized as RFC 3986 (255 characters)
othersRatio Numeric Other characters ratio
vocalRatio Numeric Vowel Ratio
digitRatio Numeric Digit Ratio
numRepeatsByUniGram Numeric Number of string repetitions by Uni-gram analysis
numRepeatsByBiGram Numeric Number of string repetitions by Bi-gram analysis
numRepeatsByTriGram Numeric Number of string repetitions by Tri-gram analysis
numRepeatsByTetraGram Numeric Number of string repetitions by Tri-gram analysis
lowFrequenceOccurrence Categoric Domains starting and ending with a digit
Table 2. URI Features
Feature Type Feature Description
queryLength Numeric URI Query Length
queryArgumentSize Numeric Number of URI Query Arguments
uriPathLength Numeric URI Path Length
uriPathLevelLength Numeric URI Path Level Length
uriPathPlusLength Numeric URI Path + Following Components Length
uriExistence Categoric URI Path + Following Components Existence
exe, bat, cmd, msi, com, drv, js,
css, dat, ppt, doc, docx, txt,
rtf, php, cgi, asp, aspx, html,
xhtml, jsf, dll, png, jpg, bmp,
bin, dll, zip, rar, swf, scr,
wpad, pac, ini
Categoric URI Extension
unknownExtension Categoric Unknown Extension (not in the feature list above)
unavailableExtension Categoric Extension not available
consonantRatio Numeric URI Base Consonant Ratio
vocalRatio Numeric URI Base Vowel Ratio
consonantVowelRatio Numeric URI Base Consonant Vowel Ratio
extensionLength Numeric URI Extension Length
Table 3. Meta Features
Feature Type Feature Description
packetSize Numeric TCP/IP Packet Size
packetSizeInexistence Categoric Unknown TCP/IP Packet Size
200, 301, 400, 404, 413 Categoric Código de Resposta HTTP
unknownReplyCode Categoric Unknown HTTP Reply Code (not present in the above feature list)
inexistentHttpRCode Categoric HTTP Reply Code not available
HTTP/1.0, HTTP/1.1 Categoric HTTP Version
unknownHttpVersion Categoric Unknown HTTP Version
inexistentHttpVersion Categoric HTTP Version not available
